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Excerpts from the Petition for Certiorari and the Appendix,
for Brown vs. The United States of America


The following analysis of the District Court decision (or Order) and the sustaining decision of the 9th Circuit shows that all the arguments contained in both are blatant nonsense.  The introduction to my Petition lists some 14 statutes that specifically require the making of assessments in various situations. There are numerous other statutes that I could have listed, but it was unnecessary.   These 14 statutes alone reveal the fraud involved in both decisions.  I also address some of the specific statutes that mandate the making of assessments further on in this analysis. 

Let us examine the specific authorities relied upon in both decisions.  The District Court based its decision on only two sources: one statute, 26 U.S.C. 6151 and one court decision, Moran v. U.S. 63 F. 3d 663 - both of which have absolutely nothing to do with either the law or facts in this case, as the following will prove.  In connection with the Court's reliance on 26 U.S.C. 6151, I wrote, as follows, in my opening Appeal Brief to the 9th Circuit:

WITH RESPECT TO CODE SECTION 6151:

Apart from Moran supra, the only other authority that Judge Pro cites to support his novel theory that assessments don't count is Code Section 6151.  Judge Pro bases his claim on paragraph 6151(a), which states as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, when a return of tax is required under this title or regulations, the person required to make such return shall, without assessment or notice and demand from the Secretary, pay such tax to the internal revenue officer with whom the return is filed, and shall pay such tax at the time and place fixed for filing return (determined without regard to any extension of time for filing the return).
However, when we examined Section 6151, the following was reveled:
1) Section 6151 is a totally benign statute, having no force and effect of law whatsoever as related to income taxes.
2) If anything, it can only apply to certain excise taxes appearing in CFR 27.
3) And, the plaintiff complied fully with the provisions of Code Section 6151 even though the statute does not apply to him or to income taxes. 
Attached, as Exhibit E, is the “Privacy Act Notice” that appears in the income tax, 1040 booklet. The only Code Sections that the Government claims are related to the payment of income taxes - and the only statutes the public is directed to obey - are Code Sections 6001, 6011, and 6012.  (These sections are examined at the completion of our comments on Section 6151.) 
Obviously, if Code Section 6151 had anything to do with income taxes, it would have been included in the Privacy Act Notice along with these statutes. This fact alone proves that the Government's reliance on Code Section 6151 is misplaced, contrived, and totally without merit.

Additionally, both Code Sections 6001 and 6011 notify the public that they need only “comply with (such) regulations as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe,” or do something “when required by regulations…” Nothing in this statute notifies the public that they are required to comply with the statutes themselves - such as 6151 - or that they have to comply (or pay attention to) court decisions involving litigation in which they took no part, such as Moran, supra. So, again, the Plaintiff's are not bound by Moran, but only a legislative, Treasury regulation having the force and effect of law.”

The fact that Section 6151 has nothing to do with income taxes is further established in Exhibit F. This is an excerpt from the Parallel Table of Authorities which shows that the implementing regulations for Code Section 6151 is in CFR 27, the Code of Federal Regulations dealing with “Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms”, in parts “17, 22, 25, 53, 194, 270 and 290.” There is no entry here that shows that any implementing regulation for this statute exists in CFR 26, the Code of Federal Regulations dealing with income taxes. This is further proof that Code Section 6151 has absolutely nothing to do with income taxes but is only related to the payment of alcohol, tobacco and firearms taxes.

However, even if we go to CFR 26 we will find a totally benign regulation in connection with this statute that appears there: it is Reg. No. 301.6151-1. It is a totally benign regulation because no legislative or other authority is shown as being the authority for this regulation.  The regulation itself says nothing anyway. Since it says (and I quote the entire regulation) as follows:

"For provisions concerning the time and place for paying tax shown on returns with respect to a particular tax, see the regulation relating to such tax."
THAT'S IT! All this regulation does, is to tell you to search out the regulation for a “particular tax” and “see” what that regulation tells you! But this regulation itself tells you nothing. It says absolutely nothing about income taxes, let alone contain a requirement that income taxes are required to be paid on any basis. So, obviously, this statute and its bogus regulation (since no legislative support for the regulation is shown) are totally benign, at least as far as income taxes are concerned.

But in any case, Plaintiff even complied with this irrelevant statute and its bogus regulation - since both the statute and the regulation deal with the payment of taxes, (as specifically worded in the regulation, and implied in the statute) “shown on a return” Plaintiffs did just that: they “paid” the exact amount of taxes “shown” on their return which was “due and owing.” 

The “amount” shown as taxes “due” on their return was “zero” and that is exactly what Plaintiff paid with their return - “zero.”  Therefore, Plaintiff complied with this statute and “paid” “without assessment or notice and demand from the Secretary” the amount of taxes “shown” on their return - just like the statute requested. However, since Plaintiffs had already erroneously overpaid the amount “shown” on their return by $5,158.39, they requested a refund for that amount. Plaintiff complied with all of the benign provisions of Code Section 6151 and its bogus regulation. Therefore, for Judge Pro to suggest that Plaintiffs violated any of the provisions of this benign statute (while he blithely proceeds to violate some fifty others dealing with the need for making income tax assessments) is incredulous to say the least.

In addition to everything else, Code Section 6151 cannot apply to the provisions of Code Section 31(a)(1). And based upon this statute, Plaintiffs are entitled to a refund for all of the reasons already stated.

In connection with Judge Pro's reliance on Moran v. U.S. I argued in my opening brief to the 9th Circuit as follows:

Judge Pro bases his irrational claim on two, irrelevant sources: Code Section 6151, and Moran v. U.S., 63 F.3rd 663. Section 6151, as the following will show, is a totally benign statute having nothing to do with either income taxes or the wage taxes at issue, while the facts and issues in Moran are not only totally unrelated to the facts and issues involved in this case, but Moran, itself, proves that income taxes are being unconstitutionally exacted.  Since all mandatory, federal taxes must be collected either on the basis of apportionment or on the basis of geographic uniformity, Moran demonstrates that income taxes are being collected differently in the Fifth and Eight Circuits from how they are being collected in the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and Federal Circuits. Therefore income taxes are - admittedly - being exacted neither on the basis of apportionment, as required in Article 1, Sections 2 and 9, Clauses 3 and 4, nor on the basis of geographic uniformity as required by Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 - and, as such, their exaction can not be made mandatory.

Thus it is undeniable, that based upon Moran - income taxes are admittedly not being enforced on the basis of geographic uniformly.  Therefore, since neither income taxes (nor the “wage” tax at issue) are not being enforced either pursuant to Rule of Geographic Uniformity nor the Rule of Apportionment, the taxes at issue are not being enforced pursuant to either class of taxes authorized in the Constitution: therefore, the United States can not retain the funds at issue, since Plaintiffs can not be compelled to pay a federal tax which is not enforced pursuant to one constitutional rule or the other. 

My Petition for Certiorari makes the same argument, 
but is reinforced with the Ott decision as follows:
As petitioners pointed out in their appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Moran v. U.S., 63 F.3rd 663 as relied on by the trial court proves that income taxes are being unconstitutionally exacted.  Since all mandatory, federal taxes must be collected either on the basis of apportionment or on the basis of geographic uniformity, Moran demonstrates that income taxes are collected differently in the Fifth and Eight Circuits from how they are collected in the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and Federal Circuits.
This fact is even more dramatically revealed in Ott v. USA, 141 F.3rd 1306 (a case relied upon by Nevada District Court Judge Howard D. McKibben in his rejection of a refund suit similar to this one, in Domingo Montijo et al. v. U.S., CV-S-97-01710-HDM (RLH)). Ott reveals that income taxes are enforced one way in the 5th and 8th Circuits, another way in the Fed. 3rd, 4th and 7th Circuits, and still another way in the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuits.  Thus it is undeniable that income taxes are not being collected either on the basis of geographic uniformity or on the basis of apportionment, and Plaintiffs asks this Court to take judicial notice of that fact. Obviously, plaintiffs have a constitutional right not to be forced to pay a federal tax that is not being collected pursuant to either one constitutional rule or the other.  If the decision of the 9th Circuit is not reversed and the funds collected are not refunded to petitioners, then it is petitioners’ claim that the income tax is being collected unconstitutionally - since it is not being collected either on the basis of apportionment nor on the basis of geographic uniformity.  Therefore, it is not being collected pursuant to any of the taxing clauses contained in the Constitution. 
It is not uncommon for Federal appellate courts to disagree on issues of law, so Federal law can be enforced one way in the 9th Circuit and yet another way in the 2nd Circuit. (The more confusing our laws are, the more money lawyers make; which is the real objective of America's legal system.) While lawyers and judges apparently see nothing wrong with this, can you imagine the public's reaction if these differences were actually published?

Here is how the publication would read: 

“This is Federal law for people living in California, Oregon, Washington, etc. etc. etc.; whereas, if you live in Connecticut, New York, etc. etc., Federal law is as follows”. 
If these differences were actually published in this manner, (so the public was officially notified concerning how Federal law varied from State to State) it would reveal the utter illegality and absurdity of these distinctions.  It should be obvious that if any law generates the amount legal controversy as revealed in the Ott decision, that law has to be declared “void for vagueness,” with Congress instructed to write a new law that the public can understand.  Obviously, if all of these judges can't agree on what the law is, how is the public supposed to know what it is?
Obviously, lawyers and judges see nothing wrong in this system because it makes money for them; however, the legal profession overlooked one thing - the Constitution specifically forbids such distinctions when it comes to taxes!  Taxes must be collected either on the basis of apportionment, as provided for in Clauses 3 & 4, Sections 2 & 9, of Article 1 of the Constitution, or on the basis of geographic uniformity as required by Article 1, Section 8 Clause 1.  Since, admittedly, neither the income tax nor the wage tax is collected pursuant to either rule - there is no way the Supreme Court can rule against the Browns (just on this issue alone), unless the Court is prepared to toss out the Constitution as well as the entire Internal Revenue Code.
When you read the 9th Circuit's decision, you will note that it affirmed Judge Pro's decision without even mentioning (let alone supporting) the legal references he relied on.  What does this tell you?  While Judge Pro had the decency to claim that he relied on, at least, one statute (even if it didn't apply), the 9th Circuit has the temerity to write a decision that, admittedly, does not rely on any statute. What does that tell you about how “law” is enforced in the US of A? 

The decision that that the 9th Circuit relied on to establish its claim that “There is no requirement that the IRS make a formal assessment…before payment is necessary,” is Zeir v. United States, 80 F. 3rd 1360.  This case was actually raised by the Justice Department in its argument to the 9th Circuit.  I disposed of it at that time in the following manner:

How did the Justice Department lawyers arrive at the novel conclusion that assessments don't count and that the Government is entitled to keep the funds at issue absent any assessment - self assessment or otherwise.  Well they claim that they relied on the following cases: Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co: 338 US 561; Zeir v. US, 80 F.3d 1360; Moran v. US. 63F3d 663; Laing v. US, 423 US 161; Crompton & Knowles Loom Works v. White 65 F.2d 132; Ewing v. US 914 F. 499; Dye v. US, 121 F.3d 1399; Fisher v. United States, 80 F.3d 1576; and Loftin & Wood, Inc. v US, 577F.2d 1206.
Plaintiffs-Appellates will not waste their time analyzing these cases since - as the statutes (as shown below) make clear, these decisions are all irrelevant.  Beside, if any judge ever ruled that funds such as those at issue can be kept by the government absent any assessment or a court determination, then any such judge would not be a judge at all, but merely a charlatan.   However, in listing these cases the government quotes Zeir v. US, supra, as holding that  “ While an assessment is thus a perquisite to (and sets limits on) certain kinds of administrative collection activity…the United States is authorized to collect a tax without assessment by simply accepting a payment to satisfy a proposed or agreed liability where forcible collection is not necessary.”   Apart from this observation from Zeir stating the obvious, it also clearly establishes plaintiffs case. 

Obviously, the IRS is “authorized to collect a tax without assessment” when taxpayers voluntary make such payments.   What is surprising about that?  But this hardly means that the IRS can compel payments when no assessment or court determinations exist.  Nothing in this quote from Zeir even suggests any such thing: yet this is the issue at hand in this case.  In addition, Zeir refers to  “a proposed or agreed liability where forcible collection is not necessary.”   None of these elements exist in the instant case. 

First of all, the funds at issue were not paid “voluntarily.”  American workers are made to believe that if they do not agree to have taxes taken from their pay (and sign W-4’s under penalty of perjury) they will go to jail.  Indeed, many of them have gone to jail for (correctly) claiming “exempt” on their W-4s, because praetorian judges and prosecutors have ruled that such a legitimate claim constituted an affirmative act of tax evasion. 

Secondly, the funds at issue were not paid pursuant to an “agreed liability.” Plaintiff's contend that there is no such thing as an income tax “liability” as a matter of law.  And even if there were, plaintiffs would still have no income tax “liability” as a matter of fact. 

In addition, as of the date that Plaintiffs filed their claim for refund, no agency of Government had even “proposed” a liability. So, where was the “agreed” or “proposed” liability in the instant case that fell within the criteria enumerated in Zeir?

In addition, the funds at issue are being “forcibly” collected.  Plaintiffs were misled and intimidated - on a variety of grounds - into allowing the funds at issue to be withheld from their pay and sent to the Government.  When they discovered the truth, they demanded a refund which the Defendant has refused to issue.  Therefore, the funds at issue have been  “forcibly collected” on this ground as well.  Further, none of the elements of the instant case fall within the criteria outlined in Zeir. 

Rather than Zeir supporting the Government's position, it is clear that Zeir - for all of the above reasons  - SUPPORTS THE PLAINTIFFS’ POSITION.   Therefore, based on Zeir alone, it is pointless to analyze any of the other cases cited by the Government since, as in the case of Zeir, none of them can be any more supportive of the Government's position then was Zeir.    Besides -falsus in uno falsus in omnibus.

Incredibly, the Government's footnote on page 10 of its Reply Brief further establishes plaintiffs’ case.  (Prompting plaintiffs to ask, “Does the Government understand its own pleadings?”), since it correctly states that a law suit is necessary “to collect a tax ‘without assessment.’”  This was actually covered and asserted in plaintiffs’ Opening Brief  (pages 8 & 9). Since neither of these conditions are present in the instant case, the Government has no lawful basis to keep the funds at issue - as confirmed in the Government's own brief. 

IN ADDITION, NONE OF THE COURT DECISIONS CITED BY THE GOVERNMENT ARE BINDING ON PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

For the following reasons, none of the cases cited by the Government can be binding on plaintiffs-appellants anyway. The Privacy Act Notice in a 1040 booklet (Exhibit E in plaintiffs-appellants Opening Brief) specifically directs the public to Code Sections 6001, 6011, 6012 and to none other.  So we must assume that the Government, in this manner, puts the public on notice as to what laws they must obey in matters involving income taxes - since these are the only statutes to which the public is directed.   I would ask the Court to take judicial notice that both Code sections 6011 and 6011 notify the public that they need only comply with regulations.  These statutes do so in the following manner. 

Code Section 6001 says, in relevant part that:

Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title…shall…comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe. (Emphasis added)

Code Section 6011 says, in relevant part:

When required by regulations proscribed by the Secretary any person etc. etc. etc.

          Therefore, this Court must take judicial notice that the U.S. Congress in both statutes, 6001 and 6011, put the public on notice that they need only comply with “regulations.”  Nothing in Sections 6001 and 6011 informs the public that they must obey statutes - or court decisions involving litigation in which they took no part.  In other words, the only thing that Congress requires the American public to obey in connection with income taxes is Treasury Department regulations.  And there is no legislative regulation that requires plaintiffs-appellants to pay income taxes, let alone the wage tax at issue. 

So the assumption by defendant that plaintiffs-appellants are bound by all those court decisions cited in its Reply Brief (litigation in which plaintiff-appellants took no part) is total nonsense.  The U.S. Congress never passed a law binding Americans to litigation in which they took no part and were not a party to.   If Congress never passed such a law, how can plaintiffs be bound by all the court decisions cited by the Government?   Indeed, if the American public were bound by such court decisions, the American public could never know what the law is unless they spent countless hours in law libraries looking up hundreds of court decisions many of which are in conflict with each other. Therefore such a claim is nonsensical on its face.

So while the public is only bound by Treasury Department regulations, the Defendant has not cited one legislative regulationthat would require plaintiffs -appellant to pay income taxes, let alone allow the Government to keep the funds at issue. 

What the Defendant has sought to do in the instant case, is attempt to treat the opinions of judges as the equivalent of statutes passed by Congress - overlooking entirely that the public is only obliged to comply with regulations.  In seeking to elevate judicial opinion to the status of “law” which plaintiffs-appellants are supposedly obliged to obey - the Justice Department was apparently unimpressed by the words of John Marshall as reproduced on page 16 of Exhibit D of plaintiffs’ Opening Brief.  Therefore, it bears repeating here, and plaintiffs ask this Court to take judicial notice of the words of John Marshall explaining that courts are “the mere instruments of the law” and not the “law” itself. 

"Judicial power as contra distinguished from the power of the laws has no existence.  Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing.  When they are said to exercise discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it.  Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge, always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other words, the will of the law." (emphasis added)( Osborn et al v. The Bank of U.S., 6 L Ed. 204)

In the instant case, the “ will of the law” is clear - as shown by the following statutes passed by Congress.  The “law,” therefore, does not consist of the biased and often conflicting opinions of judges (as reflected in the court decisions cited in the Government's Reply Brief) but is contained in the following, representative statutes - all of which have been ignored by the Government in its Reply Brief - and in the underlying decision. 

Section 6201, for example, clearly states, in relevant part, that “The Secretary is authorized and required to make …assessments of all taxes …imposed by this title. (Emphasis added).”  Is the Government suggesting that this statute is without force and effect and the Secretary is not “required” to make the assessments called for by this statute - or that the legal implication to the public is the same whether tax assessments exist or not? 

Apparently, according to the Government - and to District Court Judge Philip M. Pro - it makes no difference whether the Secretary follows the law or not. What purpose, therefore, does Section 6201 serve?  A simple reading of the law and common sense tells us that until an assessment is made - no taxes can be owed.  How else can this statute be read?  If taxes can be owed absent of assessments - then what purpose do assessments serve, and why do we bother providing for them at all? 

Section 6203 further provides that “Upon request of the taxpayer, the Secretary shall furnish the taxpayer a copy of the record of the assessment.”   If taxpayers can owe income taxes absent assessments, why would “taxpayers” bother to get a  “copy of the record of assessment” from the Secretary?  What would it tell him?  How much they owed?   But if they owed the same amount absent assessments, why bother to get  “a copy of the record of assessment”?  Presumably if plaintiffs-appellants wrote to the Secretary pursuant to Code Section 6203 they would be told that they haven't been assessed for any 1996 income taxes for that year.  What possible meaning would that information convey?  That they owe taxes for 1996 anyway?  If so, how much do they owe?  And who determined it, and when? If this Court will advise plaintiffs-appellants

  1.  How much in 1996 income taxes they owe?

  2.  When that liability was determined? and

  3.  Who determined it?

Plaintiffs will be happy to pay that amount - as long as the Court also provides them with a copy of the delegation of authority of the person who determined their 1996 income tax liability, along with the legislative regulation that requires them to pay that amount. 

Further Section 6303 provides, in relevant part that “the Secretary shall, as soon as practicable, and within 60 days, after the making of an assessment of a tax pursuant to section 6203, give notice to each person liable for the unpaid tax, stating the amount and demanding payment….”  However, since according to the Government taxes can be owed absent assessments, the Secretary can presumably demand payment at any time - whether assessments exist or not and regardless of the provisions of this statute.  If taxes can be owed absent assessments as argued by the Government  - why can't the Secretary demand payment at any time, whether assessments exist or not? 

If taxes can be owed absent assessments, does this not mean that the IRS can seize property and impose tax liens even though no assessments exist?  If income taxes can be owed absent assessments as the Government (and Trial Court) suggest, why can't the IRS seize property and impose liens absent assessments?  Presumably, therefore, even though there are statutes to the contrary, the IRS is free - according to the Government and the Trial Court   - to seize property without bothering: to make termination assessments as required by Code Sections 6851(a) and 6852(a)(1)(B); or jeopardy assessments as required by Code Sections 6861(a) and 6862(a); and can impose liens absent assessments even though Code Section 6322 states that “the lien …shall arise at the time the assessment is made.” 

And, of course, Code Section 6204 provides for the making of “a supplement assessment whenever it is ascertained that any assessment is imperfect or incomplete…” If assessments don't count, as the Trial Court and the Government now claim, why is it important that they be corrected if they are  “imperfect or incomplete”?  If assessments count for nothing, what difference does it make if they are “imperfect” or  “incomplete.”? 

In addition Code Section 6213(c) provides that “If the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Tax Court within the time proscribed…. The deficiency…. shall be assessed, and shall be paid upon notice and demand…,” while Section 6214 provides that the Tax Court can redetermine an amount greater than the deficiency and that the additional amount “should be assessed if claim therefor is asserted by the Secretary…”   In addition,  Code Section 6215 provides that “If the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court, the entire amount redetermined as the deficiency by the decision of the Tax Court…shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice of demand….”  If assessments count for nothing as the trial court and the Government claim, why would not the simple decision of the Tax Court be enough to require payment of the deficiency?   Why does the law require that even a Tax Court's “redetermination” has to be “assessed” before it needs to be “paid.”? If someone wins a civil law suit does the amount awarded have to be “assessed” before the prevailing party is entitled to collect the award?  The answer, of course, is no.  It is therefore clear that for tax purposes, there must be an assessment, even after the Government wins in Tax Court.  If taxpayers are not even required to pay a Tax Court determination until after that amount is “assessed,” how can the Trial Court and the Government claim that Plaintiffs are required to pay an income tax (i.e. the Government can legally keep the $5,035 at issue as payment for 1996 income taxes) absent of either a Tax Court determination or an assessment? 

 In ruling that income taxes can be owed absent assessments, the Trial Court and the Government in its Reply brief have tossed the above 11 statutes and at least 30 others into the trash can, while seeking to replace them with the irrelevant and jaundiced opinions of judges who may have as little regard for the law and the Constitution as does Judge Philip W.  Pro, the trial judge in this case, and the Justice Department lawyers who prepared the Government's Reply Brief. 

Apart from both courts making absurd claims with respect to assessments and relying on court decisions that, at the very least, were irrelevant; both courts refused to even address the “wage tax,” issue, much less attempt to refute it.  The following will show how I addressed the “wage tax” issue in my Motion for Reconsideration to the 9th Circuit.  I have included my argument to the 9th Circuit (rather than the one I made to the Supreme Court) just to show that my argument to the 9th Circuit was extensive, yet they refused to address it in this issue.
 

In rendering their decision, the Honorable James Browning, Clifford Wallace and Edward Leavy blatantly disregarded numerous statutes contained in the Internal Revenue Code, as well as numerous, relevant Supreme Court decisions.  The panel also blatantly ignored and disregarded the apportionment provisions of the United States Constitution especially as they apply to the wage tax imposed in Code Section 3402 and to the $5,035.57 at issue.

The facts in this case are simple.  Plaintiffs paid $5,035.57 in wage taxes as imposed in Code Section 3402.  This amount was fraudulently collected by the defendant in the guise of “Income tax collected at source” as Code Section 3402 is fraudulently captioned.  Apart from the wording of the statute itself, Code Section 6413 clearly identifies that a wage tax is “imposed” in Code Section 3402, having nothing to do with the income tax imposed in Section 1. Code Section 6413 states in relevant part that:

"If more than the correct amount of tax imposed by section 3101, 3111, 3201, 3221, or 3402 is paid etc. etc. etc.”  (Emphasis added)

Clearly, a wage tax is imposed in Code Section 3402, having nothing to do with the income tax imposed in Code Section 1 or the 16th Amendment. Plaintiffs extensively briefed both the trial court and this Court that a direct, tax on wages as imposed in Code Section 3402 would be an obvious violation of the apportionment provisions of the Constitution as contained in Article 1, Sections 2 and 9, Clauses 3 and 4 - if it were not refundable as provided for in Code Section 31(a)(1).   Plaintiff also extensively briefed both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit on appeal that an unapportioned, direct tax imposed directly on wages was obviously unconstitutional. Plaintiff pointed out in his pleadings to both courts that a tax imposed directly on a “source” of income (such as wages) had to be apportioned, as the Supreme Court clearly ruled in Brushaber v. Union Pacific RR, 240 US 1, and Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust, 158 U.S., 158 U.S. 601. In upholding the lower court's granting of a summary judgment to the Government, the Ninth Circuit (following the lead of the trial court) ignored both the apportionment provisions of the Constitution and the Brushaber and Pollock decisions. 

In addition to ignoring the above statutes and Supreme Court decisions, both the trial court and the 9th Circuit panel also ignored the provisions of Code Section 31(a)(1).  This statute provides that:
 

"The amount withheld, as a tax under chapter 24 (which includes Code Section 3402) shall be allowed to the recipient of the income as a credit against the tax imposed by this title."
In filing their 1996 income tax return, plaintiffs-appellants showed a “zero” as the amount of income taxes they claimed was due and owing.  Therefore based on the provisions of Code Section 3402 and 31(a)(1), the “credit” they were entitled to, had to take the form of a cash refund of the  $5,035 the Defendant was holding.  Clearly, pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 6501(c)(1) it can not be contended by either the trial court nor the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals that as of the date plaintiffs-appellants filed their 1996 income tax return and claim for refund that they owed more in income taxes than the “zero” shown on their 1996 tax return.   Code Section 6501(c)(1) provides that: 
"In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed or a proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assessment at any time. "
Therefore, unless and until the Government assessed an amount of income taxes against plaintiffs-appellants (in excess of the “zero” shown on their return) as being due and owing for 1996, or secured a judgment against them for a greater amount, as a result of a “proceeding in court,” as provided for in Code Section 6501(c)(1) it can not be contended by this or any other court that plaintiffs-appellants owed more in 1996 income taxes than the “zero” shown on their 1996 income tax return. 

Therefore any claim by the Government or any Court that as of the date that plaintiffs-appellants filed their 1996 return and claim for refund, that they owed more than the “zero” shown on their return, would amount to a blatant and deliberate violation of Code Section 6501(c)(1).  It is clear, that if a federal court were to rule that plaintiffs-appellants owed more in income taxes than the “zero” shown on their 1996 income tax, despite the fact that no assessment nor any judgment for any greater amount then “zero” exists against them, then that court would also have ruled that Code Section 6501 (c)(1) is without legal force and effect.

The above by no means covers all the issues and authorities covered in my Petition and Appendix. 

The bottom line is this.  There is no way that the Supreme Court can hear this case and not rule in favor of the Browns, since there is simply no way the Court can get around the statutes, constitutional provisions and other authorities that support the Browns’ claim for refund.  And once the Supreme Court rules in favor of the Browns, the income tax is over. 

Why?

Because once the Supreme Court rules that the Browns are legally entitled to get back their “withholding taxes” every other wage earner in America can do the same thing.
This, of course, would end the “withholding tax” - i.e. the “wage tax.”  And  if “income taxes” could not be collected on a weekly basis, in advance; almost no one in America would have the funds available to pay the income tax the following year - overlooking the fact that by filing a “zero” return, nothing would be due the following year anyway.   So the Brown case will end the income tax, without the Supreme Court having to declare any law unconstitutional. 

All we are asking the Supreme Court to do is to enforce the laws (and a number of their prior decisions) as currently written.  And if they do that the income tax is over and we can put the Federal government back in the bottle. 

Now, many pessimists tell me that “the Supreme Court will never hear this case” However, the Supreme Court must hear this case, since this is the first time the constitutionality of the “wage tax” has been made an issue.  How can they not address this issue, especially since both the trial and appeals court obviously ducked it?  The buck stops at the Supreme Court.

Notice I am not urging that the Supreme Court declare the wage tax is unconstitutional.  It is only unconstitutional if the Browns don't get their refund - which they clearly have a right to, based on numerous laws and constitutional provisions.  If the Browns don't get their refund, then the “wage tax” is unconstitutional on a variety of grounds as clearly set forth in my Petition.   The integrity of the Supreme Court is on the line here.  How can the Supreme Court allow the Federal Government to blatantly steal the Browns’ money? 

Now, some say,   “The Supreme Court doesn't have any integrity anyway.”  I might agree with that, but the Supreme Court doesn't want the public at large to know this.  They still have a reputation to maintain.  However, the issues in the Brown case are so simple that even the village idiot can understand that the Browns are entitled to a refund.  If the Supreme Court denies them that refund, then the Supreme Court Justices are clearly involved in the obstruction of justice and violations of their oaths of office.  Can the Supreme Court really allow the Government to collect a tax that millions of Americans (including all the village idiots) know is being collected unconstitutionally? 

All we have to do is make sure that the Supreme knows that a substantial segment of the public knows that the Browns were entitled to the refund that the trial and appellate courts refused - on specious grounds - to grant them.  This is a win win situation.  If the Supreme Court hears the case, we must win.  If it elects not to hear this case, the Supreme Court's reputation goes down the tubes for all eternity.   Suppose the Supreme Court justices find 200,000 or so letters awaiting them when they return from their summer recess asking them to hear this case?   How can they not hear it?  All we have to do is make sure that they get all those letters.   And with the power of the Internet that should not be too difficult.
I have sent copies of our Petition and Appendix to the New York  & LA “Times,” the “Wall Street Journal,” the Washington “Post” & “Times,” the “Las Vegas Review Journal, ” but none of these papers will do a story involving a tax that no one even knows exists.  So we have to publicize the existence of this Petition ourselves.  You should e-mail copies of this material to everyone on your e-mail list.  Call up radio talk shows and talk about the Brown case now before the Supreme Court.  Until the Supreme Court  “denies cert, ” it is a live and newsworthy issue.  Let's make the most of it. 
 

Please join us in this historic event, 
and get all your friends to write to the Supreme Court at,

The Supreme Court of
The United States of America
1 First St., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20543. 

The letter does need not be long.  Just simply copy and paste the following, and mail it.



As an American wage earner I respectfully request that this Court grant certiorari in the case of Brown v. US, Docket No.  992066. It involves a tax that effects every working American, the Federal “wage tax”; yet no court has ever considered the legality of this tax.  Therefore, the Supreme Court must consider it now.

You can get bound copies of the Petition and Appendix from Freedom Books.  We are asking for a minimum $50.00 contribution to help us promote and publicize this case. We have devoted hundreds of hours moving this case through the courts. Any financial help you want to throw our way to help us publicize it, will be appreciated.  Given the proper level of promotion, this case will end the income tax. 

One further thing.  Since the Federal Government succeeded in hoodwinking the public into believing that “withholding taxes” involved income taxes, it was able to extend the scam to other forms of  “withholding”; such as from pension distributions, dividends, interest, the sales of stock, gambling winnings, etc. etc. etc. However, once the public understands that “wage withholding” has nothing to do with income taxes, but is actually a “wage tax,” how can such a tax be “extended” to other sources of revenue.  So this case will also be the death knell to all other forms of “back up withholding.” 
So, now go forth and publicize the Brown case, and we will end the income tax in short order. 


 For More Information on this Case
Call:
  1- 800 829-6666

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